A Policy of Futility: Eamon de Valera’s Anti-Partition Campaign, 1948-1951 by Kelly, Stephen
 Études irlandaises 
36-2 | 2011
Varia
A Policy of Futility: Eamon de Valera’s Anti-
Partition Campaign, 1948-1951
Stephen Kelly
Édition électronique
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/etudesirlandaises/2348
DOI : 10.4000/etudesirlandaises.2348
ISSN : 2259-8863
Éditeur
Presses universitaires de Rennes
Édition imprimée
Date de publication : 30 décembre 2011
ISSN : 0183-973X
 
Référence électronique
Stephen Kelly, « A Policy of Futility: Eamon de Valera’s Anti-Partition Campaign, 1948-1951 », Études
irlandaises [En ligne], 36-2 | 2011, mis en ligne le 30 septembre 2013, consulté le 01 mai 2019. URL :
http://journals.openedition.org/etudesirlandaises/2348  ; DOI : 10.4000/etudesirlandaises.2348 
Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 1 mai 2019.
© Presses universitaires de Rennes
A Policy of Futility: Eamon de
Valera’s Anti-Partition Campaign,
1948-1951
Stephen Kelly
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
A version of this article was presented at the annual Political Studies Association of
Ireland Postgraduate Conference, at the Department of Government, University College
Cork, on 26 April 2009. The author would like to thank Dr. Michael Kennedy for reading
earlier drafts of this article.
1 In recent years historians have almost completely ignored Eamon de Valera’s 1948 to 1951
world-wide  anti-partition  propaganda  campaign1.  This  is  surprising  as  a  number  of
accounts from the mid-1980s,  in particular those of John Bowman, T.  R.  Dwyer,  Tom
Gallagher and David Harkness,  did cover certain aspects  of  de Valera’s  anti-partition
campaign2.  However,  these  works  are  now  dated;  they  were  too  early  to  avail  of
important documents released since the early 1990s from the national archives of the
Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom3. In addition their authors
did not have access to the personal papers of Eamon de Valera and Frank Aiken4. Using
these  most  recently  available  sources  this  article  provides  the  first  comprehensive
analysis of de Valera’s world-wide anti-partition campaign.
2 Following the conclusion of World War II in 1945 the issue of partition represented a
conundrum for de Valera. Due to Ireland’s neutrality, Northern Ireland’s participation in
the war effort and the strategic importance of the island in the event of a future war,
both  Britain  and  America  categorically  rejected  the  prospect  of  a  united  Ireland.
Propaganda, therefore, became de Valera’s last resort. Having admitted he was unable to
offer  any immediate  solution to  partition5,  he  instead maintained that  a  Fianna Fáil
government represented the best chance, when the circumstances arose, of achieving
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Irish unity6. At the 1945 and 1946 Fianna Fáil Ard Fheiseanna (conferences) he used his
keynote Presidential address to announce that a world-wide anti-partition propaganda
campaign would form the basis of Fianna Fáil’s partition policy in the post-war period7.
3 Following Fianna Fáil’s relegation to opposition in February 1948 de Valera decided to
commence his much anticipated world-wide anti-partition campaign.  Never before or
after  did  Fianna  Fáil  place  such  importance  on  the  employment  of  anti-partition
propaganda.  The premise of  this  article  is  that  de Valera’s  world-wide anti-partition
campaign was a policy of futility. His use of propaganda both abroad and in Ireland was a
failure.  His  speeches  during  his  worldwide  enterprise  reinforced  Ulster  Unionists’
convictions that a united Ireland was impossible, highlighted the American government’s
lack of interest towards ending the partition of Ireland, and confirmed to the British
government that Irish unity was unattainable without the support of the majority of
citizens within Northern Ireland.
 
Dev’s tour stage 1: from New York to New Delhi, March
– June 1948
4 In March 1948 de Valera commenced the first stage of his anti-partition tour. He spent
the following four months travelling almost 50,000 miles, visiting the United States of
America, Australia, New Zealand and India. The first stop was the country of his birth,
America. He arrived in New York on 4 March 1948. It was almost twenty years since de
Valera last visited America. Accompanied by his loyal lieutenant Frank Aiken, the Irish
delegation  was  greeted  with  an  enthusiastic  welcome  from  Irish-Americans.  Frank
Gallagher, director of the Government Information Bureau from 1939 to 1948, recalled
that a parade through New York’s main thorough-fares, in honour of de Valera, was the
biggest seen since the end of World War II8. De Valera travelled 10,000 miles over three
weeks,  visiting  Boston,  Chicago,  Detroit,  Los  Angeles,  Oklahoma, San  Francisco  and
Philadelphia.
5 De Valera’s speeches in America had two dominant themes: that the partition of Ireland
was illegal, and that the British government should make a declaration in support of Irish
unity. That Ireland was illegally divided constituted the main argument in most of de
Valera’s  anti-partition speeches while  in America.  In every city,  town and village he
visited  he  spoke  of  the  crime  of  a  divided  Ireland  and  against  the  illegality  of  the
“Partition Act” of 19209. He routinely declared that Northern Ireland was “not a historic
entity10” and instead exclaimed that partition had divided “the ancient nation of Ireland11
”.
6 His visit to America in 1948 was the ideal opportunity to propagate the anti-partitionist
orthodoxy that laid claim to Northern Ireland as the stolen and sundered “Six Counties”.
From the inception of the Northern Ireland state,  following the British government’s
passing of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, Irish nationalists had refused to accept
the formal partition of Ireland into two separate political jurisdictions12. For the majority
of  nationalists,  in  both  parts  of  Ireland,  the  right  to  rule  of  the  Northern  Ireland
government was illegitimate. The Act was denounced as an “illegal Act” – forced upon the
Irish by their British superiors13. De Valera repeatedly pronounced that no one in Ireland,
including the unionist population, had voted for what they termed the “Partition Act14”.
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7 That the British government should make a declaration in support of Irish unity was
based on de Valera’s assumption that because Britain had imposed partition it  had a
responsibility  to  find  an  ultimate  solution  to  the  “Irish  question15”.  In  America  he
demanded that Britain face its “moral obligations” and help end partition16. Speaking in
San  Francisco  he  was  unequivocal:  Ireland  had  been  “mutilated”  by  the  British
government creating a situation where partition was the “outstanding cause of quarrel”
between Britain and Ireland17.
8 Although during the late 1930s de Valera did receive a sympathetic hearing from the
Neville Chamberlain government of  his request for a declaration in support for Irish
unity, by the conclusion of World War II the situation had changed drastically. Given Irish
neutrality the British government maintained that Irish unity was an unattainable short-
term objective as Northern Ireland’s war-time efforts and the strategic importance of the
region in the context of a further war meant that the British would not agree to end
partition.
9 Politically, de Valera’s American speeches were a failure. The Dominions Office in London,
which kept a file on de Valera’s trip to America, reported that “Mr de Valera’s United
States tour had little effect in influencing general  United States opinion on the Irish
partition issue18”. The Commonwealth Office recorded on de Valera’s American tour that
“Irish  politics  seemed to  have  ceased to  be  an issue  of  the  moment  to  the  mass of
Americans19”. A show of sympathy, much less a show of support, was not possible for the
American  government  considering  Irish  neutrality  and  the  post  war  “special
relationship” between America and Britain. Indeed, following the conclusion of the war in
the State Department’s view it was better to let the partition dog slumber20.
10 De Valera was aware that the American government had no interest for his anti-partition
propaganda campaign, or indeed Dublin’s calls for Irish unity. During a brief interview
with American president Harry S. Truman, de Valera did not mention partition21. Despite
this he failed to recognise that his anti-partition propaganda campaign bolstered the
State Department’s opinion that the question of Irish reunification was a concern for the
Dublin and London governments and thus was “not a problem in which the United States
might properly concern itself22”.
11 From America, in late April 1948, de Valera commenced the next leg of his anti-partition
journey,  where  over  several  weeks  he  visited  Australia  and  New  Zealand.  On  the
invitation of Rev. Daniel Mannix, Archbishop of Melbourne and former President of St.
Patrick’s College, Maynooth, de Valera arrived in Sydney on 28 April. From Australia, on
24  May,  de  Valera  travelled  to  New Zealand,  where  he  had a  two hour  meeting,  in
Wellington, with the New Zealand prime minister, Peter Fraser23.
12 During  his  stay  in  the  Southern  hemisphere  de  Valera’s  speeches  were  once  more
characteristically  based  on  stressing  the  “cruel  injustice  of  partition24”.  Speaking  in
Melbourne, Australia, to a gathering of approximately 20,000 people, he said partition
was “deeply resented by his people” and its continued existence was a “grievous wound25
”. In Auckland, New Zealand, Ireland’s troubled relationship with Britain was a central
theme of de Valera’s speeches. The “only outstanding question between Britain and Éire”,
he said, was that of partition26.
13 De Valera’s campaign in the Southern hemisphere was a flop. Although he reported to
Dublin that he received an enthusiastic reception, he did concede that there were not
many Irish of first generation in either Australia or New Zealand27. The reality was that
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the anti-partition propaganda campaign was not well received by the majority of either
Australians  or  New Zealanders.  Irish  minister  plenipotentiary  to  Australia  Thomas  J.
Kiernan reported that the Australian people seemed little interested in de Valera’s tour28.
The high commissioner for the United Kingdom in New Zealand, Patrick Duffy, explained
that de Valera’s visit had caused Fraser “some embarrassment29”. Kathleen Barrett, an
Irish descendent from Wellington, New Zealand, wrote that the subject of partition was
“anathema in this country30”.
14 The main issue of contention for many of the Australia and New Zealand population was
Ireland’s  decision to remain neutral  during World War II.  According to reports  from
British officials in Australia, de Valera’s visit “provided evidence of little sympathy for
Éire’s attitude during the war31”. On several occasions de Valera was forced to defend
Ireland’s policy of neutrality. He reminded his audiences that “until Ireland had complete
independence, it would be strange to ask her to join a crusade to gain independence for
other countries32”. His arguments,  however,  were not sympathetically received by his
hosts.  This  was  not  unexpected  considering  that  over  1 million  Australians  and
approximately 200,000 New Zealanders had fought under the flag of the Commonwealth
during World War II.
15 From Australia de Valera and Aiken arrived at the next destination of their anti-partition
propaganda campaign, Calcutta, India, on 14 June 1948. Unlike the lukewarm reception
which de Valera had received from the America, Australia and New Zealand governments,
his  arrival  was  warmly welcomed by the  Indian government.  On their  first  night  in
Calcutta  de  Valera  and  Aiken  dined  with  the  governor  of  Bengal,  Chakravarthi
Rajagopalachari.  The  following day  the  Irish  delegation travelled  to  Delhi  were  they
lunched with the governor general of India, Lord Mountbatten. This was followed later in
the day with a meeting with Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru33.
16 Privately, Nehru expressed his deep sympathy for the anti-partition cause in Ireland and
noted that he saw Ireland as an ally to India in her quest for independence from Britain34.
There were marked similarities between the partitioning of Ireland and India as both
countries had been within the British Imperial system and in each case partition took
place coincidentally in time with a transfer of power, although limited in the Irish case, to
indigenous authorities35.
17 De Valera’s time in India again exposed the limitations of the anti-partition propaganda
campaign. A British official noted that de Valera’s stay in India, given the lack of an Irish
audience, “would deprive Mr de Valera of any field for anti-partition propaganda36”. One
must acknowledge that de Valera was, first and foremost, a politician and thus his anti-
partition campaign abroad was predominantly for home consumption in Ireland, and not
necessarily intended to offer any immediate solution to partition.
18 Nevertheless, even if an anti-partition propaganda campaign was the best way to practice
his trade while in opposition, his methods merely confirmed that he was unable to deal
with the political  reality:  Irish unity was unattainable in the medium-term.  His  time
abroad showed his inability to foster a new approach to partition. His placing of the
blame  for  partition  on  the  shoulders  of  the  British  government,  and  his  continued
portrayal of Ireland as a wounded victim showed him to be politically sterile on the issue
of Irish unity. This approach was, after all, a reiteration of his partition policy since the
early 1920s.
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Dev’s tour stage 2: Ireland and Britain, October 1948-
March 1949 
19 In October 1948,  accepting an invitation from the Anti-Partition of Ireland League of
Great Britain, de Valera commenced the second stage of his anti-partition propaganda
campaign. From October 1948 to February 1949 de Valera travelled to Britain where he
visited a series of centres of the Irish diaspora. He opened his campaign at a monster
meeting in Liverpool,  and over  the subsequent  weeks attended similar  anti-partition
rallies in Glasgow, Cardiff, Cambridge and Manchester. After a break for Christmas, in
February 1949, he travelled to Birmingham, Newcastle, London and Sheffield37.
20 De Valera’s speeches on partition throughout his time in Britain were as much about
confirming as about converting opinions. The perception of Northern Ireland as a British
garrison helped to reinforce de Valera’s argument that Ireland was illegally divided. He
spoke of the presence of a military force stationed in Northern Ireland holding down the
Catholic minority. Routinely he explained that Britain held the border with “a chain of
customs  posts  and  customs  officials38”.  He  demanded:  “stop  coercing  Ulster39”.  In
Birmingham he claimed that Northern Ireland was controlled by “13,000 armed agents of
the  Orange  Gestapo,  under  the  guise  of  Special  Constables40”.  Arthur  H.  Johnson,  a
concerned Ulster Unionist sympathiser from Northampton, a large market town in the
East Midlands of England, informed the Stormont government that “this fellow de Valera
is on the war path in Northampton41”.
21 The Belfast government, which kept a file on de Valera’s anti-partition activities in Great
Britain, sought to counteract any possible publicity that de Valera would secure during
his anti-partition campaign42.  The Stormont authorities had received reports from the
Ulster Office in London that de Valera was making embarrassing speeches during his tour
of Britain43. Under the authority of Northern Ireland minister for finance, John Maynard
Sinclair, it was decided that “Ulster’s war effort” and the “fact that the vast majority of
our own people desire to remain in the UK” would constitute the central message of
Ulster Unionists’ counter-publicity campaign44.
22 If de Valera’s trip to America had not been a success in propaganda terms, his campaign
in Britain was doubly difficult. Hugh Delargy, British Labour politician and chairman of
the Anti-Partition of Ireland League of Great Britain, had been present at most of the
major meetings in Britain when de Valera spoke. Although he recalled that they were
“enormous and enthusiastic meetings […], in the biggest cities”, in retrospect, he believed
that 
they were all flops. They were not political meetings at all. They were tribal rallies:
tribesmen met to greet the Old Chieftain. The melodies of 1916 were played. A few
IRA  veterans,  with  their  Black  and  Tan  medals,  formed  guards  of  honour.
Sympathetic Englishmen who attended went away bewildered45.
23 The Irish high commissioner in London, John W. Dulanty, informed officials in Dublin that
de Valera’s visit to Britain had not been altogether successful. Dulanty explained that
although 7,000 people attended a rally in Liverpool, with many of them paying as much as
twelve shillings to attend, their early enthusiasm quickly waned because of de Valera’s
“indulging in a lengthy statistical survey46”. Secret intelligence reports from the Chief
Constable, Lancashire, unenthusiastically reported that “mostly Irish people attended” de
Valera’s meetings, which were “boring47”. The most common criticism aimed at de Valera
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was that he was preaching his anti-partition message to the converted. Indeed, Desmond
Ryan, who had fought alongside de Valera during the 1916 Rising, wrote that the anti-
partition campaign only seemed to “shout with the converted48”.
 
Total propaganda: the All Party Anti-Partition
Committee
24 Taoiseach John A. Costello’s announcement in September 1948 of his intention to repeal
the External Relations Act of 1936 and in its place declare Ireland a Republic was the first
step by the Inter-Party Government to erode Fianna Fáil’s perceived monopoly over the
partition issue49.  The dust  had hardly settled surrounding the repeal  of  the External
Relations Act when the Inter-Party Government, under the new minister for external
affairs, Seán MacBride, opened up a second front in its attempts to wrestle away from
Fianna Fáil control of partition policy.
25 On entering government MacBride had become anxious that the partition issue was being
used for party purposes as a result of de Valera’s anti-partition propaganda campaign50.
Thus, in April 1948, he made the decision that partition policy would be taken out of the
hands of the government and handed over nominally to the newly formed All-Party Anti-
Partition Committee. The Committee consisted of the four major political parties, Fine
Gael, Labour, Clann na Poblachta and Fianna Fáil. In forming the committee MacBride
hoped that Fianna Fáil would no longer be able to exploit the freedom of opposition to
embarrass the government on its partition policy; simply put, if all parties sat under the
auspices of a partition committee, the chance to exploit government mistakes and make
political capital from them was limited.
26 An unsigned and undated directive outlined the purpose of the Committee. It read: 
The task of the committee should be primarily to assist in the creation of public
opinion  favourable  to  the  unification  of  the  country,  in  Ireland,  Britain,  in  the
United States, Australia and in such other parts of the world as may, from time to
time, be expedient51.
27 The inaugural gathering of the Committee occurred in late January 1949. In attendance at
the Mansion House in Dublin were Costello,  MacBride,  William Norton,  Tánaiste  and
minister  for  Social  welfare,  de  Valera  and  Aiken52.  The  first  public  initiative  of  the
Committee was for the organisation of a campaign fund outside local churches, in support
of  Northern  Nationalist  anti-partitionist  candidates  in  the  Northern  Ireland  general
election  set  for  10  February  1949.  Northern  Ireland Prime Minister  Sir  Basil  Brooke
announced that “partition was to the main issue” of the general election53. Cross-border
tensions had grown since de Valera’s anti-partition propaganda campaign to America and
Britain – he had overplayed his hand in his relationship with the Ulster Unionists. His
tour of America had annoyed Stormont immensely, resulting in a return of megaphone
diplomacy between Dublin and Belfast.
28 By early February 1949, the fundraising campaign for Northern Nationalist candidates
had collected over £42,00054. The financial success of the campaign was not matched in
the election itself, as Northern Nationalists performed poorly at the polls. The net result
of southern politicians’ interference in the Northern Ireland election was disastrous and
merely seemed to contribute to the Ulster Unionist Party achieving one of its greatest
victories in its history; the Northern Ireland Labour Party was all but wiped out at the
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polls  and after  its  defeat  decided to  publicly  declare  its  support  for  partition,  while
reactionaries regained the ascendancy within the Ulster Unionist Party55.
29 De Valera’s involvement, although it may be argued reluctantly, with the All-Party Anti-
Partition Committee, further underlined his lack of vision on partition. On the one hand
de Valera had appealed for a relationship based on goodwill with the Northern Ireland
majority, who he hoped would convert 300,000 unionists to agree to a united Ireland. On
the other hand his anti-partition propaganda campaign sought to expose the “evils of
partition”  and  reveal  the  extent  to  which  the  Ulster  Unionist  regime  discriminated
against  Northern  Ireland  Catholics.  In  his  1948  leaflet  Partition,  Why  Not? Rev.  J.  G.
MacManaway embodied Ulster Unionists’ revulsion of de Valera. Not only had de Valera’s
“anti-British  attitude  and  actions  alienated  the  Ulster  people”,  but,  according  to
MacManaway, de Valera’s policy of neutrality and insistence on the use of the Gaelic
language in schools and government made cordial relations impossible between Dublin
and Belfast56.
 
“You have carved up our country57”: de Valera and the
Ireland Act
30 By the summer of 1949, de Valera’s anti-partition propaganda campaign took on a new
level of intensity – it was a change in direction that de Valera had been unprepared for.
The catalyst was the British government’s decision to introduce an Act to safeguard the
constitutional position of the Northern Ireland government within the United Kingdom58.
31 On 3 May 1949 the British government formally announced, under the title, “The Ireland
Act”:
That Northern Ireland remains part of His Majesty’s dominions and of the United
Kingdom … that  in  no  event  will  Northern  Ireland  […]  cease  to  be  part  of  His
Majesty’s  dominions  and  of  the  United  Kingdom  without  the  consent  of  the
parliament of Northern Ireland59.
32 Whitehall’s decision to introduce the Ireland Act initiated a crisis in Anglo-Irish relations
that had both immediate consequences for de Valera’s anti-partition propaganda
campaign, and ultimately long lasting significance for Irish nationalists’ hopes for Irish
unity. Significantly the introduction of the Act forced de Valera to acknowledge that his
use of propaganda to help end partition had proved futile. Not since the introduction of
the Government of Ireland Act in 1920 had partition been so resolutely confirmed. From
this moment onwards he was forced to concede that the ending of partition was a long-
term aspiration rather than a medium-term objective.
33 De Valera was in London at the time of the declaration and the statement seemed to
perturb him immensely. He felt that the Act was further evidence of the poisoning effect
of partition on Anglo-Irish relations. His anti-partition propaganda speeches took on a
new level of intensity not before seen during his propaganda campaign. He believed that
the British had embarked on a “mad course” and instead of cementing good relations
with Ireland they had chosen to “blow them up60”. He found it “hard to believe” and
wrote that “it makes one desperate61”.
34 Privately,  British  Prime  Minister  Clement  Attlee  explained  that  because  of  Irish
“aggression”  in  the  context  of  Dublin’s  anti-partition  campaign  and  the  Republic  of
Ireland  Act,  he  was  fully  prepared  “to  make  it  clear”  that  the  British  government
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condemned Ireland’s  interference in Northern Ireland affairs62.  Attlee  was  personally
extremely unhappy because of de Valera’s “intensified” anti-partition campaign, which
the prime minister wrote had embittered Dublin’s relations with London and Belfast63.
35 London’s  decision  to  introduce  the  Act  deeply  depressed  de  Valera  and  made  him
question the validity of his anti-partition propaganda campaign. Instead of encouraging
and nurturing support for ending partition, his campaign exposed the inability of Irish
nationalists to influence British policy on partition. Thus, in early 1950, he abandoned his
anti-partition propaganda campaign. On visits to Birmingham, Cardiff and Newry in the
early months of 1950, de Valera did not speak of partition64. Similarly during visits to
France, Switzerland, Italy, Greece and Israel, in April 1950, once again he decided not to
mention  partition  in  any  of  his  speeches65.  In  Ireland  he  was  likewise  reluctant  to
continue his anti-partition mission; at Bruree Co. Limerick, in June 1950, in front of a
crowd of over 10,000 people, de Valera spoke predominantly on the need “to work for the
[Irish] language”, while partition was ignored66.
36 In London, in March 1951, in response to a question concerning a quick end to partition,
de Valera’s sense of melancholy was vividly apparent: “you can always say that a thing
that will happen is nearer to happening to-day than it was yesterday67.” The Irish general
election of May 1951 gave minimal attention to partition; instead the traditional election
policies, the economy, social problems, emigration and Church-State relations dominated
the campaign. De Valera was noticeably silent on the issue and rarely discussed partition
during the campaign68. Gone were the hostile soundbites of previous years. Propaganda
had been tried but had failed – paradoxically, this tactic had merely helped to entrench
partition rather than help remove it.
 
Conclusion
37 De Valera’s use of propaganda as a tool to preach the injustice of partition was a policy of
futility. As Aldous Huxley poetically noted, “the propagandist is a man who canalises an
already existing stream. In a land where there is no water, he digs in vain69”. De Valera
was  digging  in  vain.  Perhaps  he  realised  this  as  he  never  again  embarked  on  an
international anti-partition tour. He had learned a valuable lesson that propaganda only
offered superficial success. His international campaign showed that the global community
cared little about the partition of Ireland and Irish unity.
38 The extent to which de Valera’s campaign alienated Ulster Unionists was significant. His
unrelenting  verbal  assault  against  Ulster  Unionists  was  a  poisonous  feature  of  his
campaign and merely helped propagate the notion that unionism and Irishness were
incompatible – that there could only be one or the other.  Such actions revealed the
naiveté of de Valera’s approach to partition – he ridiculed those whom he admitted he
required to achieve Irish unity.
39 De Valera’s involvement with the anti-partition propaganda campaign in Ireland showed
how unable he was to develop a new approach to tackle partition. He relied on outdated
methods and philosophies. The All-Party Anti-Partition Committee’s financial support of
Northern Nationalist anti-partitionist candidates in the 1949 Northern Ireland general
election was a political disaster that merely strengthened the hand of Ulster Unionists.
40 By early 1950, de Valera terminated his anti-partition campaign. He had by then realised
that  to  expose  the  “injustice”  of  partition had merely  exposed the  inability  of  Irish
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nationalists to secure Irish unity. Privately, de Valera admitted that “a more realistic
attitude”  to  the  partition  question  was  now  needed70.  Upon  Fianna  Fáil’s  return  to
government  in  May 1951,  de  Valera  began to  dismantle  the  anti-partition apparatus
abroad and in Ireland.
41 By the summer of 1951, he ordered that the Irish government cease to financially support
the Irish Anti-Partition League in Northern Ireland and the Anti-Partition of  Ireland
League of Great Britain. He believed that both movements had no practical value because
partition policy  was  the  responsibility  of  the  government  and not  of  external  lobby
groups71.  He likewise relinquished any meaningful association with the All-Party Anti-
Partition Committee72.
42 In government from 1951 to 1954 and from 1957 to 1959, during his final years in active
politics, de Valera abandoned a propaganda-based anti-partition policy and replaced it
with a policy of “persuasion” that sought to foster cross-border co-operation between
Dublin and Belfast73. He was never again to advocate a policy of propaganda to help bring
an end to partition. The ‘sore thumb’ approach of stressing the “crime” of a partitioned
Ireland had run its course. Ernest Blythe eloquently appraised the futility of de Valera’s
anti-partition propaganda campaign: “Our speeches and articles about the injustice of
partition […] must be likened to the shooting off of good ammunition at the smoke-trail
of a ship which has passed by and is long out of range74”.
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1. See Diarmaid Ferriter, Judging Dev, a Reassessment of the Life and Legacy of Eamon de Valera,
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RÉSUMÉS
Cet  article  propose  la  première  analyse  complète  de  la  campagne  internationale  contre  la
partition de l’Irlande entreprise par Eamon de Valera de 1948 à 1951. En premier lieu, il examine
la  propagande  que  de  Valera  a  mise  en  œuvre  aux  États-Unis  d’Amérique,  en  Australie,  en
Nouvelle-Zélande et en Grande Bretagne dans le but de mettre fin à la partition de l’Irlande.
L’article analyse ensuite l’implication de de Valera dans la campagne menée en Irlande. Le propos
cherche à démontrer que la propagande anti-partition faite par de Valera tant en Irlande qu’à
l’étranger  s’est  avérée  inefficace,  voire  contre-productive.  Au  lieu  de  contribuer  à
l’accomplissement de l’unité irlandaise, sa campagne n’a fait que renforcer la partition de l’île.
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This article offers the first comprehensive analysis of the world-wide anti-partition campaign
undertaken by Eamon de Valera from 1948 to 1951. First, it examines the propaganda de Valera
employed in the United States of America, Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain in support of
ending  the  partition  of  Ireland.  Second,  it  analyses  de  Valera’s  involvement  with  the  anti-
partition campaign in Ireland. The central argument is that de Valera’s use of propaganda abroad
and in Ireland to make a case against partition was a policy of futility. Instead of working towards
the achievement of Irish unity, his campaign only helped to entrench partition.
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